large, treat management technology as real.
Accounting rules may be an imperfection but not a hard constraint.
Sociologists have given much attention to technology-task constraints on organizations. They also have extensively analyzed power and authority. In many organizations a major component of the system of rule is expressed through budgets and accounting rules by making allocations. And these sociologists have . .
largely ignored. -Why sociologists have ignored the issue is a matter for the sociology of knowledge. Sociologists of organizations found accounting to be dry. Accounting seemed fixed. In a sense, accounting rules have been treated as ' givens, as part of a technical-cultural process which need not be analyzed.
. .
I believe that we are about to witness a large scale change in the utility of analysis of accounting and budget rules and enterprise rules for the analysis of organizations. I feel a bit like Rip Van Winkle. I went to sleep ten to fourteen years ago, believing that an important topic was overlooked (Zald, 1970a (Zald, , 1970b . During the last decade I have largely worked in other areas, only occasionally doing work on organizations. Now, as I return to the study of .complex organizations, I find an active research community addressing issues of . , budget and accounting systems. New journals, such as Accounting Organizations & Society, directly address problems of the relationship of organizations and accounting. Economists working on the theory of property rights and agency, are very much aware. of the role of incentive systems, incentive rules and financing I find it somewhat strange, however, that, although there has been increasing interest in these topics by scholars either interested in organization theory, or the effects of incentive systems, these interests have not penetrated more general theoretical treatises. Until they do, general discussion of control and authority will remain abstract. and detached. In this paper I wish to outline a research program and a set of research topics that would eventually allow us to show how organizations are deeply shaped by enterprise rules, by various accounting and investment rules and systems. I see the venture as potentially useful for accounting researchers, but even more important for a deep, historically based, culturally informed analysis of organizations.
Our topic is broader than just a focus on accounting rules. I take it that accounting rules and accounting practice are methods for measuring and assigning costs and incomes to various categories for use in information systems. In a narrow sense, the sociology of accounting rules would not deal with budgets, would not deal with financial investment measurement systems, would not deal with the larger processes and rules governing property rights in organizations and criteria for changing property rights. Accounting and budget systems are set up within a. set of sovereign relations, yet sovereign relations are not given, and the choice of enterprise-property rules affects accounting rules and relations.
Changes in the law of corporations affects accounting rules and practice. I believe that nesting the narrower analysis of accounting rules in the larger budget-property rights system, both internal and external to organizations, will lead to a fuller understanding of the regulated and rule-based nature of organizations.
The system of enterprise rules, accounting regulations and budget and accounting practices that shaped the behavior of the 14th century merchant of Florence was much different from those surrounding the railroad magnate of the late 19th century.
And those, in turn, were much different from those surrounding the late twentieth century real estate developer. Only as we understand more of those differences and learn to think about them will we grasp the essential transformations and differences among organizations.
What Kind of Organizational Theory?
What type of organizational theory which will. best end up accomodating and being invigorated by close attention to rule systems and budget allocation systems? First, the theory or framework has to see the evolution of organizations and related accounting systems in historical context. Of course, the trends of modern life and of modern society are such as to spread accounting budget systems across nations. Thus, Leontief's input-output matrix accounting for national economies may be -as useful in Gambia and Grenada as in Great Britain. Nevertheless, over ti.me and in different industries at different times, and in different types of socio-economic systems, the nature of accounting rules, the type of system selected, vary substantially. The rule systems that we -are talking about are part of cultural systems for societies as a whole. (National boundaries are permeable boundaries.) Any rule or rule system develops in one organizat:on, or to meet specific emerging problems and then are implemented in many other organizations or situations. The usual pattern is for a process of innovation, proposal, dissemination through professional groups and professional socialization and transmission to individual organizations and institutions.
This occurs both through the good practice manuals of professional groups, textbooks, the practices of auditing firms and the requirements of key external groups such as the Securities Exchange Commission, the Snternal Revenue Service and the civil and criminal courts.
. So, in the first instance', the theory or the organizational framework has to be one that is open to historical context and experiences the process of adoption and implementation.
Second, as implied above, the framework has to be open to, and sensitive to, industry and organizational differences. The rules that get applied, the accounting-financial regimes, are sharply structured by industry differences, by how accountants, executives and regulatory agencies have come to grips with the problems of control and allocation in specific industries. Insurance accounting is different from public utility accounting, which, in turn, is different from hospital accounting. They.differ in their reserve requirements, in the relation of accounting information to managerial decisions, and so on. Moreover, not-for-profit government agencies, partnerships, and corporations have fundamentally different reporting requirements and accounting systems. And of course, the accounting allocating systems that, exist in socialist societies will differ on fundamental dimensions from those in capitalistic systems.
Third, the organizational theory should understand the play of adoption and reaction to rules in specific organizations. For example, all research universities in the United States must have procedures for estimating indi'rect costs on research grants and allocating revenues from indirect cost returns.
While the former may be standardized to meet government auditing requirements, the latter varies widely, so that indirect costs in some universities flow through directly to the research investigator or the research unit, and in other universities indirect cost returns are loosely coupled to the decision process as to how much space, equipment, facilities to give the research generating units.
What kind of theories or theoretical framework will be most useful? It seems to me that we first can say that some theories, or theoretical frameworks, while very valuable for some classes of problems, will not turn out to be very useful to the study of organizational rule systems, accounting rules, budget allocations. In particular, I do not believe that population-ecology models (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) , or abstract organization-environment models and approaches are nuanced enough to come to grips with the textured nature of accounting rules and budget systems. The more abstract models seem to assume much of the rule system as an intervening black box in examining the more macro processes. The large claim that I am making is that organizational theory must become more historically grounded, must be attuned to the larger system in which organizations exist. To say that organizational theory must be historically grounded means more than that it must take account of time and historical change.
We have had a discipline of administrative history and of business history that have been of little value to the more generalizing aims of organizational theory. (But see Zimbalist, 1980) In the quest for historical generalization, they tend to underplay the extent to which the capitalist system varies in important ways Selznickian analysis is holistic. It treats the interplay of organizations in environments. ' It examines the goals, conflicts, and commitments of the powerful and the powerless as they interact to produce products and obtain resources and legitimacy from the environment. My own political economy approach uses a strong analogy to societal political economy. It examines the interaction of the internal political structure and economy (system for producing goods and services) with the external polity and economy in which it finds itself.
In the remainder of the paper I wish to take up specific topics in which a historical-organizational approach will use the rule setting process, the accounting budget process, as aspects of organizational analysis. First I will discuss 'enterprise rules, the transformation of rules or property rights, property ownership, and financial investment that can transform the operation of organizations. These property and enterprise rules set constraints on accounting and budget allocation systems. Secondly, I discuss the external process of rule making and rule setting and its impact upon accounting procedures. Third, I will touch upon enterprise forms and industry differences in accounting and budgeting regimes. Fourth, I will discuss the valuational-accounting process and budget systems within organizations. internal top management and outside investors with access to large pools of monies; 2) 'the ability of families to continue to control enterprises they develop; 3) the extent to which the short and long term interests of stockholders are protected in the contests for control of enterprises.
11. 'Anti-trust rules effect the structure of organizations and industries in that they shape investment opportunities across and between industries. Choices.
of conglomeration, within industry oligopolization, vertical integration, all respond to enterprise rules.
Since managerial strategies; tasks, and organizational structure are shaped by the number of product lines, inter-relations of material transformation tasks internalized in the firm and number of related and unrelated markets that the firm faces, enterprise rules indirectly affect managerial strategy. Finally, the structure of power in capitalist nations is shaped by these enterprise rules.
Although the.focus has been on enterprise rules in the for-profit sector, a parallel analysis could be made for the governmental sector and for other, enterprise forms. Note, for instance, how the American polity leaves. formal authority to local and state governments in contrast to either England or France. Rule Making, Surveillance, and Enforcement ,Enterprise rules and accounting rules are different in that the former deal with property rights, the ownershsip and rights of disposal and allocation of goods and services, .facilities and equipment, while the latter deal with the valuation and recording of property, goods and services. They are similar, however, in that for many purposes the rules are set external to the enterprise.
In an earlier set of papers (Zald, 1978 1968) I attempted to examine the processes by which modern society creates a social control matrix for industries, a class of organization producing relatively similar goods and services. The argument was that, to understand the social control of organizations, you had to take into account a) that a major source of control were market forces, and markets. The term "markets" applies to competing organizations, that is industries, and b) that society developed rules and regulations that were industry and technologically specific. There are control agents and procedures for the education industry, for medical accreditation; there are control agents and procedures for the regulated utilities and for the construction industry, and for boiler inspection and insurance.. So, to understand social control of industries, products and processes, you had to examine the organized processes of control.
Once you begin to dig into non-market mechanisms of control, the visible, rather. than the invisible hand, you also need to make a distinction between rule making, infraction surveillance, and enforcement.
Rule making, surveillance and enforcement may be a function of one agency.
Or they may be more or less separate tasks. In the accounting area, relevant rules are established by professional standard setting boards such as the One aspect of industry is the accounting-taxation regime that applies to it. This is well-tread ground for the accountant. Problems of depreciation, the establishment of reserves for risk-taking, are well understood. There are specialists in the treatment of research and development expenses, in gas and oil exploration accounting and capitalization, in insurance accounting. As new Soon, I believe, we will have a map of organization-industry characteristics that tells us much about specific organizations based upon the industry in which they exist. (Dess and Beard, 1984). We will be able to say something about the socio-demographics of labor, size, rates of growth, concentration ratios, turnover, unionization, all as a function of industry. We also will know how particular industries interface with other industries. What we need as an accompaniment is a parallel map of the accounting, budgeting capital regimes.
It is my belief that the enterprise form chosen in an industry is partly a response to problems of accounting and income reporting in particular. The structure of investment in gas and oil exploration and in construction is partly a function of the rule system and incentives that are in operation in these particular industries under capitalism. (They do it differently in the Soviet Union!) Whether an industry is populated by partnerships, privately" held corporations, publicly owned corporations, proprietorships, relates to capital demands and flows, which are shaped by accounting devices, tax law, and investment instruments.
In construction, the largest companies have net worths that would easily rank them in the Fortune 500. Yet they tend to be family-held, private corporations; they are heavily dependent upon capital gains and the intricacies of depreciation rules for their profitability. Return on investment may be high in the long term, but annual profits from operating income may be quite low in the short term. Indeed, networth may grow based on unrealized capital gains, contract-accounting rules between suppliers and manufacturers, as well as between manufacturers and dealers in the automobile industry, can be subjected to systematic analysis. Similarly, the reimbursement formulas and related systems for hospitals, schools, and universities can be subjected to systematic analysis.
External budgeting, funding rules and procedures can have a range of impacts on the operation of the organizations to which they apply. Second, external funding formulas shape organizational choices and policies.
In the medical system the reimbursement formula affects patient care decisionsnot only who to treat, but how to treat. Choices of specific processes, choices of in-hospital treatment versus external treatment are all subject to reimbursement formula issues. In high schools, attendance policies are set partly in response to "student days" components of state reimbursement fo.rmulas. Although what is proposed may not be news to accountants, it will have consequences for them as well. For too long accounting and budget processes have been separated from the corpus of social science analysis. A two-way street may be opened.
